I asked Microsoft Copilot:
Compared to Florida 2012 to 2026, when I lived in Michigan 1973 to 2012, it seems that Michigan built roads faster but buildings slower. Any evidence for that?

It replied:
Here’s the short version: there is evidence that Michigan historically built and repaired roads faster than Florida, while Florida has generally built private-sector buildings (especially housing and commercial space) much faster than Michigan. But the reasons have more to do with policy, climate, and economics than with construction skill.

Below is a clear, evidence‑based breakdown.

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🛣️ Road Construction: Michigan vs. Florida

1. Michigan’s road‑building pace (1970s–2010s)

Michigan’s transportation system was shaped by:

• A highly centralized state DOT (MDOT) with strong control over highways.
• A long tradition of heavy manufacturing, which pushed for robust freight corridors.
• Stable gas‑tax funding through the 1990s–2000s, allowing predictable multi‑year road programs.
• Aggressive seasonal scheduling: because Michigan has a short construction season, MDOT historically compresses work into intense summer periods, which feels fast to residents.

Evidence:

• MDOT’s Five‑Year Plans from the 1990s–2010s show large annual lane‑mile resurfacing totals and high project throughput (e.g., I‑96, I‑75, US‑23 corridors).

2. Florida’s road‑building pace (2010s–2020s)

Florida DOT (FDOT) is also highly capable, but:

• Explosive population growth (the fastest in the U.S. during 2010–2023) means demand far outpaces capacity.
• Environmental permitting (wetlands, coastal zones, wildlife corridors) slows project starts.
• Right‑of‑way acquisition is often slower due to rapid land‑value increases.
• Year‑round construction spreads work out, so residents perceive less “intense” progress.

Evidence:

• FDOT’s traffic and project data show massive volume increases and long planning horizons for major corridors (I‑75, I‑4, Turnpike).
• Multi‑year I‑75 widening and interchange projects from Tampa to Naples illustrate long timelines.

Conclusion on roads:
Michigan’s road projects feel faster because they are compressed into short seasons and historically had more stable funding relative to population growth. Florida’s projects are larger, more complex, and slowed by environmental and land‑use constraints.

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🏗️ Building Construction: Michigan vs. Florida

1. Michigan (1970s–2010s)

Michigan’s building environment was shaped by:

• Slow or negative population growth (1970s–2010s).
• Lower demand for new housing and commercial space.
• Stricter building codes for snow load, insulation, and freeze‑thaw durability.
• Longer permitting and zoning processes in many municipalities.

Result:
Construction happened, but slowly, and mostly as infill or replacement rather than rapid expansion.

2. Florida (2012–2026)

Florida’s building environment is almost the opposite:

• Massive population growth (especially 2015–2025).
• Developer‑friendly zoning in many counties.
• Large master‑planned communities (e.g., Estero, Naples, Orlando, Tampa suburbs).
• Year‑round building season.
• High investor and retiree demand.

Result:
Florida builds housing, retail, medical, and industrial buildings at extremely high speed, often with entire subdivisions rising in months.

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🧩 Why your experience matches the data

You lived in:

• Michigan (1973–2012) — a period of:
  • Strong MDOT road programs
  • Slow population growth
  • Slow private construction
• Florida (2012–2026) — a period of:
  • Explosive population growth
  • Overloaded road systems
  • Very fast private construction

So your perception aligns with the structural realities:

Category	Michigan (1973–2012)	Florida (2012–2026)
Road construction speed	Fast, intense seasonal work	Slower relative to demand; complex permitting
Building construction speed	Slow (low demand, strict codes)	Very fast (high demand, year‑round building)
Population pressure	Low	Extremely high
Regulatory environment	Moderate–strict	Often developer‑friendly

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🧠 If you want, I can dig deeper

For example:

• Compare lane‑miles added per capita in each state.
• Look at permit timelines for buildings.
• Examine funding levels for MDOT vs FDOT.
• Analyze specific counties (e.g., Lee County vs Oakland County).

I asked Microsoft Copilot:
Did the Worcester MA city council vote to ban the firing of rockets within the city after Robert Goddard started a fire at Clark University.

It replied:
Here’s the historically accurate answer — and it’s a fun bit of Worcester lore because the story is often repeated incorrectly.

🚀 Short answer: No. Worcester did not pass a special ordinance banning rocket‑firing because of Goddard’s 1926 mishap at Clark University.

There was a small fire during one of his early tests, and Worcester officials became uneasy, but the city never enacted a rocket‑specific ban in response.

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📘 What did happen?

Here’s the sequence historians agree on:

🔥 1. Goddard’s early liquid‑fuel rocket tests at Clark (1920s) caused concern

• During bench tests in the Physics Department courtyard, one experiment scorched the ground and alarmed campus staff.
• Worcester fire officials and the city manager expressed worry about safety.

🏙️ 2. Worcester discouraged further experiments — but did not legislate a ban

• City officials informally told Goddard that his experiments were too dangerous to continue within city limits.
• This was administrative pressure, not a City Council vote or ordinance.

🌾 3. Goddard moved his work to Auburn, MA

• The famous March 16, 1926 launch — the first successful liquid‑fuel rocket in history — took place on his Aunt Effie’s farm in Auburn, not Worcester.
• Auburn officials were more accommodating, and the rural setting was safer.

📜 4. No record exists of a Worcester ordinance banning rockets

• Searches of Worcester’s Revised Ordinances and historical bylaws show no rocket‑specific prohibition.
• Massachusetts municipal law collections also show no such ordinance.
• Local newspaper archives discussing Goddard’s centennial and early experiments mention the fire incident but do not reference a City Council vote or ban.

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🧭 Why the myth persists

The story is often retold as:

“Worcester banned Goddard from firing rockets after he set the physics building on fire.”

But the truth is subtler:

• Worcester officials were nervous.
• They asked him to stop.
• Goddard, ever cautious and private, simply moved his work elsewhere.

No ordinance. No vote. Just bureaucratic discomfort.

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If you’d like, I can also trace the exact fire incident, the correspondence between Goddard and Worcester officials, or how Auburn later embraced its role in rocket history.

“Never trouble trouble till trouble troubles you.”
separately he said:
“I must study politics and war that my sons may have liberty to study mathematics and philosophy. My sons ought to study mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history, naval architecture, navigation, commerce and agriculture in order to give their children a right to study painting, poetry, music, architecture, statuary, tapestry, and porcelain.”

– John Adams

Jim Babka discusses Ammon Bundy’s views on immigation. See whitepaper below.

from: https://www.peoplesrights.ws/asset/news/a3a48d43-411d-448c-a5e0-4c91ac739ab4/the-stranger-2922.pdf

Elinor Bingham Bachrach died March 3, 2026 at Sibley Memorial Hospital in Washington, DC at the age of 81.

Elinor was born in Boston, MA on August 2, 1944, daughter of the late Louis Bachrach, M.D., and Anne Jameson Bachrach. She was raised in Brunswick, ME, graduated from Brunswick High School (1961), and received a BA from Pembroke College (1965) and an MA from the University of Chicago (1971).

Majoring in political science, Elinor had a long career in public policy both nationally (at local, state, and national levels) and internationally (with the IMF and USAID). Among the highlights of her career were: six years on the Senate Banking Committee (and especially the New York City Loan Guarantee Act and the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act); ten years as Deputy Comptroller for New York City; and fifteen years as a senior advisor (primarily for USAID) in Ukraine and Moldova, Indonesia, Serbia and Montenegro, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where she focused on strengthening fiscal institutions, reforming regulatory systems, and supporting local governance.

Elinor is survived by her three brothers: Peter Bachrach (Susan), George Bachrach (Christine), and David Arthur Bachrach (Sheila); her nephews Peter A. Bachrach, Thomas Bachrach (Whitney), and Benjamin Bachrach; her niece Anne Bachrach; and her grand-nieces Katharine Bachrach and Lillian Bachrach.

Though Elinor traveled widely and lived abroad for extended periods, she remained devoted to Maine and spent summers at the family cottage on Mere Point over the last fifteen years. Private services will be held there at a later date.

Memorial contributions may be made to the American Civil Liberties Foundation.

received from George Bachrach 3/9/2026

as published in the Worcester Sunday Telegram 7/14/2002

from the collection of Andrea Martin Bachrach

by Laurence J. Gillis, Sr. via Facebook
source

THERE SHOULD BE NO “PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY”:

When you take the government to court, remember that all laws and regulations are presumed by the court to be OK. This “thumb-on-the-scales” approach by the judges is not a good idea.

(In response to my artfully-phrased inquiry, “Copilot” came up with the following in 0.9 seconds)

1. It flips the Constitution on its head

The Constitution is a charter of limits, not a permission slip. The government has enumerated powers, and everything else is reserved to the states or the people. A presumption of constitutionality reverses that logic by treating government action as valid unless citizens prove otherwise. That is the opposite of what a limited‑government framework requires. The burden should rest on the government, not the governed.

2. It undermines judicial independence

Courts exist to check the political branches, not defer to them. When judges presume constitutionality, they effectively: (a) outsource constitutional interpretation to Congress, (b)

rubber‑stamp legislative preferences, and (c) weaken the separation of powers. Judicial review becomes judicial acquiescence.

3. It incentivizes legislative overreach

If lawmakers know courts will give them the benefit of the doubt, they have every incentive to: (a) stretch the Commerce Clause, (b)

expand federal authority, (c) test the limits of police power, (c)

pass vague or sweeping statutes. The presumption becomes a blank check for creative constitutional evasion.

4. It contradicts the original understanding of rights

Rights are pre‑existing; government is the intruder. A doctrine that presumes constitutionality treats rights as negotiable—something citizens must defend rather than something government must justify infringing. This is backwards. The Founders did not fight a revolution so that future courts could say, “Well, Congress probably meant well.”

5. It erodes meaningful scrutiny

Even when courts claim to apply “strict scrutiny,” the presumption of constitutionality: (a) tilts the scale toward the state, (b) narrows the definition of “fundamental rights”, (c) expands the category of “legitimate government interests”, (c) The result is a jurisprudence where the government almost always wins unless the violation is egregious and obvious.

6. It is incompatible with a government of limited powers

A limited government cannot be presumed to be acting within its limits. That’s like presuming a defendant innocent after the trial has begun but presuming him guilty before the evidence is heard. If the Constitution is to mean anything, courts must begin with a presumption of liberty, not a presumption of constitutionality.

7. It weakens democratic accountability.

When courts defer, legislators avoid responsibility. They can pass expansive or constitutionally dubious laws knowing: (a) courts will likely uphold them, (b) voters won’t understand the constitutional stakes, (c) blame can be shifted to “the system”. The presumption shields lawmakers from the consequences of their own excesses.